The Supreme Court has held that persistent denial of conjugal relations without reasonable cause, when supported by the evidence, constitutes mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. Further, prolonged separation over a substantial period, complete cessation of cohabitation, emotional alienation, and absence of genuine efforts at reconciliation may also be taken into account by an appellate court as constituting mental cruelty, even where desertion as an independent statutory ground has not been specifically pleaded, because appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings and subsequent events may be considered in assessing the pleaded ground of cruelty.
The Court further laid down that, independently of the statutory ground of cruelty, the Supreme Court may in an appropriate case exercise its power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution to dissolve a marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown where the marriage is found to be totally unworkable, emotionally dead, beyond salvage, and continuation of the formal legal relationship would be unjustified.
A Two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih examined the grounds on which the High Court had granted divorce, including alleged insult before a shopkeeper, denial of sexual relations, long absence from the matrimonial home, and the parties living separately for 15 years. On the allegation of cruelty, the Bench found substance in the evidence that, even during the short period of cohabitation, the wife used to sleep early, lock her room from inside, not open the door despite knocking, and that the parties slept in separate rooms. The wife had not denied that they used to sleep separately.
Thus, relying on the settled position that persistent refusal of sexual intercourse without reasonable cause may amount to mental cruelty, the Bench held that denial of conjugal rights, including persistent refusal of sexual relations without reasonable cause, constitutes mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act.
The Bench further observed that, although desertion as a statutory ground under Section 13(1)(ib) had not been specifically pleaded, matrimonial disputes cannot be viewed only through isolated legal labels, and the overall conduct of the parties and their discharge of matrimonial obligations must be examined. The Bench emphasised that marriage is a partnership built on mutual respect, shared expectations and equal responsibility, and that conjugal rights are inseparable from conjugal duties. Persistent withdrawal from the foundational aspects of marriage may therefore have legal consequences in assessing mental cruelty.
The Bench also placed significant weight on the prolonged separation of more than 15 years, the total cessation of marital interaction, the absence of any genuine effort at reconciliation, and the fact that the parties had built separate lives. It held that where parties have lived separately for several years and reunion is no longer realistically possible, compelling them to continue the legal bond may itself amount to cruelty to both sides. The Bench stated that an appellate court may treat prolonged separation, coupled with absence of reconciliation and emotional alienation, as an indicator of mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia), and may also take into account subsequent events during the pendency of proceedings.
Lastly, the Bench found that the marriage had broken down irretrievably. It reiterated that, in exercise of powers under Article 142(1) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may dissolve a marriage where it is fully satisfied that the marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead, beyond salvage, and continuation of the legal relationship is unjustified. Applying those principles, the Bench noted that the parties had been living separately for more than 15 years, reconciliation efforts had failed, there were no children, and both parties were financially independent government doctors. In those circumstances, the Bench considered the case fit for exercise of Article 142 powers to do complete justice.
Briefly, the appellant-wife and respondent-husband, both doctors in government service, were married on Dec 05, 2007 under Hindu rites. No child was born from the marriage. The wife was working as a gynaecologist in Gujarat and the husband was serving in Rajasthan. The parties lived together only for about two to three months during a matrimonial period of around two years, after which the husband filed a divorce petition in 2009 under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, alleging cruelty. The Family Court dismissed the petition holding that cruelty had not been proved, but the High Court later allowed the husband’s appeal and granted divorce.
Before the Supreme Court, the wife maintained throughout that she did not want dissolution of marriage and was willing to continue the matrimonial relationship. She argued that the husband had not pleaded desertion or irretrievable breakdown in the divorce petition, that he could not take advantage of his own wrong, and that there was no evidence of cruelty by her. The husband, on the other hand, contended that the parties had lived separately for more than 15 years, had cohabited only briefly, that the wife had denied sexual relations on several occasions, and that there was no possibility of reconciliation.
