“A casual invocation of a grave charge of rape, that too, against the father of the prosecutrix, carries with it a greater social taboo and stigma that cannot be washed off easily. A man is a sum total of his reputation and how he is perceived in the society. Such perception cannot be distorted by a mere casual invocation of law that has the potential of ruining his reputation, social status and public image”
Asserting that once matrimonial relationships turn bitter, criminal law is often invoked as an instrument of personal animosity, vengeance and pressure tactics, the Supreme Court has held that it has to be extremely careful before taking cognizance of complaints made while invoking the provisions of rape, especially in cases where parties have already been heavily embroiled in matrimonial litigation, since the scope of manipulation, fabrication and vexatious litigation is exponentially high due to pre-existing bad blood between the parties who are often emotionally charged against one another and allegations of rape becomes an aid towards arm twisting tactics.
The criminal proceedings may be quashed where the allegations in the complaint, even when read with the accompanying material, do not prima facie satisfy the essential ingredients of the alleged offences; where the allegations are vague, omnibus, unsupported by specific factual particulars or corroborative material; where the surrounding circumstances render the prosecution inherently improbable; and where the case falls within the Bhajan Lal categories of abuse of process, including cases involving mala fide prosecution and allegations that do not disclose any offence, added the Court.
Applying these principles, and emphasising that an increasing number of matrimonial disputes have witnessed allegations being levelled under the POCSO Act against husbands, who are also fathers of minor children, the Apex Court held that the complaint and proceedings against the appellants could not be allowed to continue and accordingly quashed the complaint, the cognizance order and the summoning order.
A Two-Judge Bench comprising Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan examined whether the allegations in the complaint and the supporting statements prima facie disclosed the alleged offences. As regards rape and penetrative sexual assault, the Bench held that invocation of Section 65 BNS and Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act required specific positive acts corresponding to the statutory ingredients.
On the material before it, the Bench found only generic and blanket allegations that appellant Nos. 1 and 4 had raped the prosecutrix, without disclosure of the date, factual particulars, sequence of acts, or supporting prima facie material. The Bench observed that, although a complaint need not be an encyclopaedia, it cannot rest on grave allegations unsupported by specific factual detail.
The Bench further found the surrounding circumstances significant. It noted that the parties were already engaged in multiple litigations, that there had earlier been no allegation of sexual misconduct despite the child having lived with the appellants for a considerable period, and that the complaint was lodged only after several prior disputes had escalated.
The Bench also considered it material that the prosecutrix had been with the complainant for months before the complaint and before recording of statements, and that the complaint, the complainant’s statement and the prosecutrix’s statement were narrated in almost identical language, order and tenor. According to the Bench, this was not mere consistency but suggested verbatim reproduction and raised a serious possibility of tutoring.
As regards the allegations against appellant Nos. 2 and 3 under Sections 115, 351 and 352 BNS, the Bench held that the material did not disclose the essential ingredients of those offences. There was no injury report or medical material supporting the allegation of hurt, no specific threat or abusive words showing criminal intimidation, and no material demonstrating intentional insult leading to breach of peace. Even the allegation regarding insertion of a hammer handle, though grave on its face, was found unsubstantiated by any medical evidence or particulars of treatment or aftermath. The Bench treated the absence of medical examination in the facts of this case as fatal because the allegations were otherwise unsupported by corroborative material.
The Bench also made broader observations on the increasing misuse of criminal law in matrimonial and analogous disputes. It cautioned that false, vague and omnibus allegations are sometimes employed as tools of harassment, arm-twisting or settlement pressure, including by invoking grave statutes such as the POCSO Act. At the same time, the Bench expressly clarified that its observations were confined to the facts of the present case and were not intended to dilute the seriousness of genuine cases of sexual abuse, rape, or violence against women and children, which must be dealt with firmly and swiftly.
Briefly, the appeal arose from the Allahabad High Court’s refusal to quash criminal proceedings in Complaint Case pending before the Special Judge (POCSO Act), Meerut. The complaint had been filed by the wife against her husband, mother-in-law, sister-in-law and brother-in-law, alleging offences under Sections 65, 74, 352, 351(2), 115 BNS and Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act. The background disclosed long-standing matrimonial discord since 2011, with multiple civil and criminal proceedings already pending between the parties, including dowry, domestic violence, divorce and other criminal cases filed by both sides against each other.
The complainant alleged that her minor daughter had been sexually abused by appellant No. 1, her father, and appellant No. 4, her uncle, and had also been beaten, abused and threatened by appellant Nos. 2 and 3. It was alleged that the father made the prosecutrix watch pornographic videos and raped her, that the uncle also raped her on multiple occasions, and that the aunt inserted the handle of a hammer into her private parts when she complained. The complaint further stated that the child later ran away, contacted the complainant, and was taken back by her, after which the present complaint was filed. The trial court took cognizance and later issued summons.
