The Supreme Court has held that a court may direct a DNA test in a paternity dispute where paternity is directly in issue, the existing evidence is insufficient to yield a categorical answer, and the balance of interests favours such testing. The Court further held that the controlling inquiry is whether scientific testing is indispensable because no other evidence can effectively answer the issue, and whether ordering the test serves the best interests of the parties and justice. On the facts of this case, since Amar’s civil suit squarely raised the question of paternity, there was no alternative evidence that could conclusively determine that issue, and the balance of interests lay in Amar’s favour, the direction for DNA testing was upheld.
A Two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh examined the settled principles governing court-directed DNA testing by referring to Goutam Kundu, Dipanwita Roy, Aparna Ajinkya Firodia, Ivan Rathinam, and Nikhat Parveen. It reiterated that DNA testing cannot be ordered as a matter of course, that such direction should be avoided if the issue can be resolved otherwise, and that the court must balance the interests of the parties, including privacy, dignity, legitimacy concerns, and the child’s interest in knowing biological parentage.
The Bench distilled the governing standard as whether the result of the DNA test is directly in issue, whether any other evidence on record can substitute for the answer that scientific testing may provide, and whether such testing is in the best interests of the parties and justice. Applying that standard, the Bench found that paternity was directly in issue in Amar’s civil suit, that the appellant had consistently denied paternity, that there was no other evidence capable of giving a categorical answer, and that earlier findings against Amar’s mother were not the result of a full civil trial on the issue.
The Bench also held that the plea of res judicata did not survive in these circumstances, and that Amar’s interest in closure and in not being denied rights that may flow from establishing paternity outweighed the appellant’s privacy objection.
Briefly, the appellant, Chaturbhuj Pradhan, challenged concurrent orders of the trial court and the High Court directing him to undergo a DNA test to determine whether Amar Pradhan is his son. Amar claimed that he was born on 10 September 1999 from consensual relations between his mother and the appellant in January 1999. The appellant denied paternity and relied, among other things, on his earlier acquittal in a rape case instituted by Amar’s mother. There had also been earlier maintenance litigation between the parties, including proceedings in which observations were made that the relationship had not been established; however, the Supreme Court noted that those earlier proceedings did not conclude the present controversy.
During the pendency of earlier proceedings, Amar, after attaining majority, filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that he is the son of the appellant and consequently entitled to a one-third share in his property. The civil court ordered DNA testing, and the High Court upheld that direction on the ground that no other evidence would sufficiently and clearly establish paternity.
