The Bombay High Court has asserted that under the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, an intermediary is not entitled to insist that action against impersonating, infringing or misleading content can be taken only upon a specific court order under Rule 3(1)(d). Additionally, the intermediary is obligated to act through its grievance redressal mechanism under Rule 3(2) upon receiving a complaint with adequate identifying material, particularly in matters involving impersonation, passing off, misinformation and fraud.
The Court held that where social media groups and online content are passing off as emanating from the plaintiff by misusing its corporate name, officials’ identities and forged documents for financial fraud, interim relief can be granted directing intermediaries to remove, delete, take down or disable such profiles, groups, accounts and content within the timelines contemplated under the 2021 Rules, subject to safeguards such as the plaintiff furnishing screenshots, identifying particulars and an undertaking as specified in the order.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh observed that in substance, the plaintiff sought an injunction against identified and unidentified WhatsApp groups impersonating the plaintiff’s CEO and officials and passing off investment tips, financial advice and stock market analysis as emanating from the plaintiff. The Bench noted that such conduct could have grave consequences because the public could be induced into believing that the advice originated from a well-known banking institution.
The Madras High Court has held that where the claim is one of passing off, and the registered mark carries a disclaimer denying exclusive rights over the disputed word element, the plaintiff must independently prove the elements of passing off, especially goodwill/ reputation and misrepresentation. Mere similarity between the word elements is not sufficient. If the plaintiff fails to establish protectable goodwill/reputation and fails to show that the defendant’s packaging or conduct amounts to a misrepresentation that the goods have a common origin, the passing off action must fail.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy noted that the trade mark journal advertisements relating to the plaintiffs’ registrations carried a common disclaimer: “Registration of this Trade Mark shall give no right to the exclusive use of the word ‘Yummies’.” The Bench therefore examined whether, despite that disclaimer, the plaintiffs could still obtain relief in passing off.
The Delhi High Court has held that a computer-related invention which merely uses an algorithm to colour-code message recipients based on message address characteristics, in order to assist a sender in avoiding unintended recipients, does not become patentable unless it demonstrates a technical effect or technical contribution that improves the system’s functionality or provides a technical solution to a technical problem.
Where the alleged contribution is only a software-based, user-convenience or data-management measure, and the claimed advance is rendered obvious by the prior art, the application is liable to be refused under Sections 2(1)(j) and 3(k) of the Patents Act. Accordingly, the impugned refusal orders against Blackberry Limited were upheld, and no order as to costs was made.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Tejas Karia observed that the invention pertains to handheld wireless communication devices and seeks to enable users to differentiate intended recipients in outgoing draft messages by colour-coding recipient names based on message address characteristics such as host name, domain name or organization. The stated objective was to help users on small-screen handheld devices quickly identify intended recipients and reduce the risk of sending messages to unintended persons. The specification also described the device architecture, including a display, keyboard, micro-processor and navigation tool such as a trackball.
The Delhi High Court has clarified that in an SEP infringement action, the Court may direct pro tem security as a temporary equitable arrangement pending adjudication, and such an order is not the same as a final FRAND determination or an interim injunction. The scrutiny at this stage is lighter and does not require a detailed merits trial. For deciding pro tem security, comparable third-party licence agreements are not a precondition, because the Court is not fixing FRAND finally at that stage.
The Court explained that where the plaintiffs show a prima facie case on validity, essentiality and infringement, and the defendants continue implementing the standard without furnishing security, the Court can require deposit of security to balance equities and protect the eventual decree. Further, a defendant implementer’s failure to disclose alternate technology despite claiming non-infringement, coupled with its own declarations of standard compliance, is a relevant basis for a prima facie inference of infringement at the pro tem stage.
Accordingly, Single Judge Bench of Justice Tejas Karia held that a foreign FRAND rate-setting action filed by the implementer may be treated as relevant material at the pro tem stage in assessing prima facie essentiality / the need for licensing, even if raised by the defendant as territorially limited. The Court therefore directed the defendants to deposit Rs. 272 crores with the Registrar General within 6 weeks, or alternatively furnish an unconditional bank guarantee from an Indian bank for that amount. At the same time, the Court clarified that the order does not amount to a final finding on infringement or liability, and does not make the plaintiffs’ licensing rate binding.
The Delhi High Court has held that, for purposes of Sections 11 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, a foreign proprietor may succeed in rectification by proving that, on the date of the impugned application, its mark had acquired actionable recognition and spill-over reputation in India within the relevant consumer segment, even without formal commercial launch or direct sales in India. In assessing such reputation, the Court may legitimately rely on third-party imports, niche market presence, public-domain references and other material demonstrating recognition of the mark in India, especially for luxury goods.
Where such evidence establishes that the claimant’s mark was a well-known trade mark in India, and the respondent’s identical mark lacks bona fide adoption, the impugned registration is liable to be treated as wrongly remaining on the Register and removed under Section 57(2), added the Court, while holding that ALPHARD was a well-known trade mark at the time of the respondent’s application. Finding the respondent’s registrations to be in contravention of Section 11, the Court directed removal of Registration Nos. 3093216, 3093218 and 3093219 from the Register.
The Division Bench comprising Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Om Prakash Shukla observed that in a rectification action under Section 57(2), a mark can be removed if it is “wrongly remaining on the Register”, and that this enquiry may require examination of whether the mark ought not to have been registered under Sections 9 or 11.
The Delhi High Court has granted interim relief to Shashi Tharoor in a suit seeking protection against AI-generated deepfake videos allegedly depicting him making false statements praising Pakistan’s diplomatic strategies.
Justice Mini Pushkarna observed that Mr Tharoor, being a recognised public figure, enjoys enforceable personality and publicity rights over facets of his identity, including his voice, likeness, vocabulary and speaking style. The Court observed: “The plaintiff has exclusive control over the utilization of his personality. No one can utilize and/or misappropriate and/or imitate any facet of the plaintiff’s personality, and/or exploit the same deceptively, or in any manner whatsoever, without the express consent/authorization of the plaintiff.”
The suit alleged that unknown persons had used artificial intelligence and machine learning tools to create “hyper-realistic” deepfake videos cloning Mr Tharoor’s face, voice and oratorical style to falsely portray him making politically sensitive statements including that “Pakistan is faring much better diplomatically than India” and praising Pakistan’s diplomatic conduct as “absolute brilliance.”
The Calcutta High Court has clarified that the amendments introduced by the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012 allow Indian Performing Right Society (IPRS) to claim royalties in respect of musical and literary works in a sound recording when such sound recording is commercially exploited. Thus, the Court held that Saregama does not have legal competence to grant a licence in respect of the underlying musical and literary works incorporated in sound recordings for Vodafone’s commercial exploitation, and Vodafone does not have licence to commercially exploit those underlying contents without express permission from IPRS.
The Division Bench comprising Justice Debangsu Basak and Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi ruled that, post-2012 amendment, the copyright in a sound recording and the copyright in the underlying literary and musical works remain legally distinct; commercial exploitation of the sound recording does not, by itself, dispense with the need to respect the statutory royalty entitlements attached to the underlying works. Accordingly, contractual arrangements between a telecom operator and a music label cannot defeat the statutory rights preserved in favour of authors / copyright societies under Sections 18, 19 and 33 of the Copyright Act, 1957.
The High Court of Delhi has granted interim protection to entrepreneur and Shark Tank India judge Aman Gupta against alleged misuse of his personality rights, trademarks and online identity across multiple digital platforms, including AI-generated content, fake endorsements, impersonation accounts and sexually explicit material.
Justice Tushar Rao Gedela passed an ex parte ad-interim injunction in a suit filed by Aman Gupta against several online platforms, unknown persons and intermediaries, observing that the material placed on record prima facie demonstrated infringement of the plaintiff’s registered trademarks as well as his personality and publicity rights.
The Court recorded that Aman Gupta, co-founder of boAt Lifestyle and a long-time investor on Shark Tank India, had acquired substantial goodwill and public recognition through his entrepreneurial ventures, media appearances and commercial engagements. The order notes that Gupta has over 1.7 million Instagram followers, more than 3 million LinkedIn followers and enjoys widespread public recognition as a business personality and youth icon.
The Delhi High Court has clarified that where a defendant’s mark wholly incorporates the plaintiff’s registered and distinctive trademark “CITYWALK” as its essential and dominant feature, and the rival marks are used in the same field of business, the addition of a house mark or prefix such as “GLOBAL” does not sufficiently distinguish the defendant’s mark. In such circumstances, if the plaintiff shows long prior use, registration, goodwill, and likelihood of confusion to a consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, the Court may prima facie hold the defendant’s conduct to amount to infringement and passing off and grant interim injunctive relief.
The Court also held that exemption from pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act may be granted where the suit contemplates urgent interim relief. Accordingly, the Court restrained the defendants, their directors/promoters, servants, agents, franchisees and anyone acting on their behalf from using “GLOBAL CITYWALK”, “CITYWALK”, or any identical or deceptively similar mark as a trademark, service mark, trading style, trade name, logo, keyword, meta tag, hashtag, domain name, or in any other manner in relation to any goods or services, whether in print, electronic, online, digital or any other form. The Court also restrained them from registering any further domain names containing “CITYWALK” or “GLOBAL CITYWALK”, and any other domain name identical or deceptively similar to the plaintiffs’ trademark.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Tushar Rao Gedela observed that the competing marks were deceptively similar. It held that “CITYWALK/SELECT CITYWALK” is a coined and distinctive mark, in use since 2004, and exclusively associated with the plaintiffs’ commercial real estate and retail business. It further observed that “GLOBAL CITYWALK” wholly incorporates the plaintiffs’ registered trademark “CITYWALK” as its essential and dominant feature, with only the prefix “GLOBAL” added. On that basis, the Bench found visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity, and held that a consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection was likely to be misled into believing an association, affiliation or endorsement by the plaintiffs.
The Bombay High Court has held that where subsequent revocation orders are founded upon an earlier revocation order concerning the same patents, and the earlier order has been stayed and later set aside, the subsequent orders cannot, at the threshold, be treated as conclusively establishing that the patents stood independently revoked, especially where the patents continued to be renewed and maintained as “in force” by the Controller and the issue of revocation remains pending for fresh determination. In such circumstances, the plaintiff cannot be said to have no real prospect of success, and summary judgment under Order XIII-A CPC is not warranted.
Further, the Court explained that where the defendants’ objection to maintainability depends upon disputed questions relating to the legal effect of revocation orders, stay orders, register entries, renewal of patents, and alleged suppression, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, because that inquiry would require the Court to travel beyond the plaint and assess matters requiring evidence. The test under Order VII Rule 11 remains confined to whether the plaint, as read, discloses a cause of action.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Arif S. Doctor observed that a plain reading of the operative parts of the 2013 and 2014 IPAB orders showed that they were based entirely on the first order dated 12 June 2012 and were not truly independent, self-sustaining revocation orders. The Bench also observed that, although the second order contained a statement that the invention lacked novelty and inventive step, it did not furnish independent reasoning to sustain revocation on its own.
The Bombay High Court has held that where the plaintiff prima facie establishes statutory rights in registered trademarks, including a well-known mark, and the defendant’s impugned mark, trading name, and domain name are phonetically and visually similar such that the plaintiff’s mark is subsumed within the defendant’s mark, the Court may infer deceptive similarity, likelihood of confusion, and an attempt to ride upon the plaintiff’s goodwill.
In such circumstances, particularly where Lijomart LLP (defendant) remains absent despite service, the High Court granted an ad-interim injunctions for infringement and passing off, and in issuing ancillary search-and-seizure relief through appointment of a Court Receiver and Special Receiver to preserve infringing material of Reliance JIOMART pending further hearing.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh recorded that the plaintiff discovered, during a routine public search in the last week of February 2025, that Defendant No. 2 had filed an application for registration of the impugned mark “LJIO” in Class 35 on a proposed-to-be-used basis and that the mark had been advertised in the trademark journal. The plaintiff had opposed that application and filed evidence. The Bench further noted that although the defendants’ trading name was “LIJOMART LLP”, the registration application had been filed for “LJIO” instead of “LIJO”, and that the defendants had also launched “LJIOMART” and were operating the domain name ‘www.ljiomart.com’ for marketing and selling sanitary ware, hardware materials, electrical and other goods, which according to the plaintiff overlapped with the plaintiff’s offerings under JIOMART.
The Delhi High Court has ruled that where the material on record prima facie shows that websites are rogue online platforms deliberately designed to facilitate unauthorised streaming and communication of copyrighted cinematograph films, including through redirect mechanisms, embedded players and exploitative use of a legitimate platform’s URL structure and goodwill, the Court may grant ex parte ad interim injunctive relief under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC to restrain such infringement and to direct domain name registrars, ISPs and governmental authorities to suspend domains and block access.
The Court’s reasoning is founded on the proposition that such conduct prima facie infringes the copyright owner’s exclusive rights under Sections 14(d) and 51 of the Copyright Act, 1957, that the defendants in such a case are not passive intermediaries where they actively facilitate infringement, and that the balance of convenience and irreparable harm requirements are satisfied in favour of the copyright owner.
The Delhi High Court has asserted that, in a design infringement action under the Designs Act, novelty and infringement must be assessed by viewing the registered design as a whole and from the perspective of the instructed eye, and mosaicing of selected features from multiple prior arts is impermissible to attack validity. A prior art challenge cannot succeed merely because individual elements of the registered design are found scattered across earlier publications; and the prior art must disclose the design in a manner sufficient to negate novelty when the design is considered as applied to the article.
The Court held that for piracy, identity is not required: if the features that impart novelty and originality to the registered design are replicated in the defendant’s article, minor differences in non-essential features do not avoid infringement. On the facts, since none of the cited prior arts disclosed the plaintiff’s design as a whole and the defendant’s fan replicated the essential visual features of the plaintiff’s registered design, the Court held that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case for interim injunction.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Tushar Rao Gedela emphasized that the burden to show lack of novelty or originality lies on the person asserting it; that a design must be compared as a whole; that prior publication sufficient to challenge validity must relate to the design itself as applied to an article; that mosaicing of prior art is impermissible; and that for infringement the comparison is to be undertaken from the standpoint of an instructed eye aware of prior art and of the features that impart novelty and originality to the registered design.
Bombay High Court Permanently Injuncts ‘UltraTech’ Infringement; Orders ?66.48 Lakh Costs
The Bombay High Court has asserted that where the plaintiff proves valid and subsisting registration, long and extensive commercial use, distinctiveness, and reputation of its trade mark, and the defendant uses marks in respect of the same goods that contain the essential and leading feature of the plaintiff’s mark and are visually, structurally, and phonetically deceptively similar, such use constitutes infringement and passing off.
The Court reaffirmed that marks must be compared as a whole, with emphasis on their essential features and overall similarity, and that Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act does not prevent protection of a prominent part of a composite mark where that part is distinctive. In an undefended action, where the defendant does not contest the evidence, the Court is entitled to grant permanent injunction, delivery up, and substantial costs, and may award monetary relief on a reasonable basis having regard to the defendant’s dishonest conduct and the statutory mandate under Section 35 CPC in commercial suits.
Accordingly, Single Judge Bench of Justice Arif S. Doctor granted a permanent injunction restraining a rival cement maker from using marks deceptively similar to UltraTech, holding that the adoption was “entirely dishonest” and “actuated in bad faith.” The Court also ordered the Defendant to pay costs of Rs. 50 lakhs to the Plaintiff. Additionally, the Defendant was ordered to pay the Plaintiff a sum of Rs. 16.48 lakhs as per the Statement of Expenses incurred by the Plaintiff.
The Delhi High Court has held that where the plaintiff is the prior adopter and user of a registered trademark which has acquired substantial reputation, and the defendant adopts a mark that retains the dominant and essential features of that registered mark with only a minor insertion such as the word “DIPPING”, such alteration does not dispel deceptive similarity. If the overall commercial impression remains such as to cause confusion to an unwary consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, the use is not honest or bona fide, and a prima facie case for injunction in an infringement and passing off action is made out.
Accordingly, the Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the defendant, its agents, suppliers, distributors, directors, employees and all others acting on its behalf from directly or indirectly dealing in the impugned products “K3 MASALA SCHEZWAN DIPPING CHUTNEY”, “GREEN PIECE SCHEZWAN DIPPING CHUTNEY”, and “FRUVATA SCHEZWAN DIPPING CHUTNEY”, and/or any products or services bearing the mark “SCHEZWAN CHUTNEY” and/or “SCHEZWAN DIPPING CHUTNEY”, and/or from using any other mark deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s registered trademark “SCHEZWAN CHUTNEY”.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Tushar Rao Gedela further directed the defendant to place on record, in a sealed cover and within six weeks from the date of service, its books of account, invoices, sales memos and/or any other documents evidencing sale of the infringing products referred to in the injunction direction. Further, the matter was directed to be listed before the Joint Registrar (Judicial) on Aug 11, 2026 for completion of service and pleadings, and before the Court on Nov 17, 2026.
The Delhi High Court has clarified that, in an appeal against refusal of interim injunction in a passing off action, the appellate court will not interfere with the discretionary order of the court of first instance unless the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or in disregard of settled legal principles. On the merits of passing off, where the rival composite marks are not deceptively similar when viewed as a whole, the plaintiff has failed to prima facie establish goodwill in the allegedly copied standalone mark, and the material on record does not show misrepresentation or likelihood of confusion among the relevant class of consumers, interim injunction must be refused.
The Court also held that delay and prolonged inaction, particularly where the defendant has openly and continuously used the impugned mark and built its own goodwill, tilt the balance of convenience against grant of interim relief. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and directions were issued for expeditious recording of evidence, failing which the suit could be dismissed for non-prosecution.
The Division Bench comprising Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora observed that, in a passing off action, the plaintiff must establish goodwill in the mark, misrepresentation by the defendant, likelihood of confusion among customers, and consequent damage. It concurred with the Single Judge that the composite marks “VAJIRAM & RAVI” and “VAJIRAO & REDDY INSTITUTE”, when compared as a whole, were not deceptively similar.
Delhi High Court Holds Google’s AdWords Use Of ‘HINDWARE’ Infringing; Awards Rs 30 Lakh Damages
The Delhi High Court has held that use of a registered, coined, and well-known trademark as a keyword under a paid search advertising programme, even where the keyword is invisible to the consumer, constitutes “use” of the trademark within the meaning of Sections 2(2)(c)(i) and 29(6)(d) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. A search engine operator that actively suggests, auctions, and sells trademarked terms as keywords to the trademark proprietor’s direct competitors, without the proprietor’s consent and for commercial gain, is not a passive intermediary but an active participant in such use. Such conduct amounts to infringement under Section 29(8) of the Trade Marks Act as it takes unfair advantage of the trademark’s reputation and goodwill, and is contrary to honest practices in industrial and commercial matters, regardless of whether likelihood of confusion is established.
The Court further laid down that the safe harbour under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act is unavailable to such a search engine operator because it selects the receiver of the transmission, fails to observe due diligence under the Intermediary Guidelines, and actively aids or induces the infringing use. The advertising function of a trademark, its ability to attract consumers to the proprietor’s goods and services, is a protectable commercial asset, and a search engine cannot be permitted to auction or monetise that asset without the proprietor’s authorisation.
The High Court therefore granted permanent injunction restraining Google LLC and Google India from using the mark ‘HINDWARE’, or ‘HINDWARE SANITARYWARE’, ‘HINDWARE SANITARY’, ‘HINDWARE SANITARYWARE INDIA’, or any combination thereof, as advertising keywords or AdWords, or in any manner amounting to infringement. The Court also awarded nominal damages of Rs. 15 lakhs in each suit, totalling Rs. 30 lakhs, payable jointly and severally by Google LLC and Google India within eight weeks. Actual costs of litigation were held payable jointly and severally by the defendant.
The Saket Bench of the Delhi District Court has that where the plaintiff proves registration of its trademark and establishes, through unrebutted evidence including registration documents, comparison of marks, and the Local Commissioner’s seizure report, that the defendants used an identical or deceptively similar mark on identical goods, the Court may hold that infringement is made out under Sections 28 and 29 of the Trade Marks Act, and where the mark and goods are identical, likelihood of confusion stands presumed. In such circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of permanent injunction, delivery up of counterfeit goods, and damages.
The Court further laid down that, for purposes of territorial jurisdiction in a trademark action, Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act permits institution of the suit at the place where the plaintiff carries on business, and where the plaintiff’s evidence shows business activity within the jurisdiction of the Court, that Court is competent to entertain the suit notwithstanding the defendants’ objection.
The District Judge Arul Varma observed that while Section 20 CPC confers jurisdiction where the defendant resides or carries on business, Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act expands jurisdiction to the place where the plaintiff actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. Relying on Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia [(2015) 10 SCC 161], the Bench held that the plaintiff’s documents, particularly the list of licensees/authorised manufacturers and sales documents, showed that the plaintiff was carrying on business in South Delhi, and accordingly the Court had territorial jurisdiction.
The Delhi High Court has asserted that in an action confined to passing off based on trade dress, the court must assess the overall visual impression and get-up of the competing products from the standpoint of a consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, and not by dissecting individual features or relying only on dissimilarities. Even where individual elements such as colour, flowers, herbs, descriptive expressions or packaging motifs may not by themselves be monopolised, their combination, arrangement and presentation may nevertheless constitute a protectable trade dress for purposes of passing off if the overall get-up has acquired goodwill and the defendant’s adoption is deceptively similar so as to cause confusion and likelihood of damage.
The Court further laid down that, at the interim stage, the plaintiff in a passing off action is not required to conclusively prove its case as at trial; prima facie material such as sales figures, market share, advertising expenditure and product history may suffice to establish goodwill and justify injunctive relief, with formal proof left to trial. The Court also held that the presence of a prominent or even well-known house mark does not necessarily neutralise deceptive similarity in trade dress, especially in relation to low-cost consumer goods where purchasing attention is limited and the overall get-up remains likely to mislead.
The Calcutta High Court has held that compliance with Rule 70(9) of the Copyright Rules, 2013 is mandatory, and failure by an applicant to give notice to every person claiming or having an interest in the subject-matter of the copyright vitiates the registration process. Further, under Rule 70(10) read with Rule 70(11), the Registrar’s duty is not exhausted merely because no objection is received within 30 days; the Registrar must independently satisfy himself as to the correctness of the particulars in the application and may conduct an inquiry if such satisfaction is absent.
Therefore, where the applicant fails to comply with Rule 70(9) and the Registrar grants registration without undertaking the required substantive scrutiny, the resulting registration is liable to be set aside as being contrary to the mandatory statutory scheme.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Arindam Mukherjee observed that the provisions of Rule 70(6) and Rule 70(9) of the Copyright Rules, 2013 have statutory force and are mandatory in nature, since rules framed under statutory authority carry “statutory flavour” and must be read conjointly with the Act. Referring to the principle in Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor [1936 Privy Council 253], the Bench observed that where a statute prescribes that a thing must be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all. Applying that principle, the Court found not only a violation of Rule 70(9) by respondent no. 1, but also a procedural irregularity by the Registrar in granting registration without ensuring compliance with the statutory scheme.
The Delhi High Court has clarified that to establish that a patent is a Standard Essential Patent (SEP), the plaintiff must prove the existence of a standard set by an SSO and also prove, by credible evidence such as proper claim mapping, that the claims of the suit patent map onto the technical features of that standard. Essentiality certificates or reports by private evaluators, being expert evidence, do not prove essentiality unless proved in accordance with Section 45 of the Evidence Act, including disclosure of the basis of the opinion and availability of the expert for cross-examination. In the absence of such proof and in the absence of claim charts, the suit patent cannot be treated as an SEP.
The Court further held that infringement of a product patent must be established through product-to-claim mapping. In an SEP matter, even the indirect method requires proof that the patent maps onto the standard and that the implementer’s product maps onto the same standard. Where no such mapping is undertaken, where the primary technical deponent does not enter the witness box, and where the alleged independent expert withholds logs and technical analysis, infringement is not proved either directly or indirectly.
The Delhi High Court has held that where the proprietor of a trademark proves, by cogent documentary material, extensive and continuous use of the mark over a long period, substantial sales and promotional expenditure, wide geographical presence, valid and subsisting registrations, broad public recognition in the relevant trade and consumer segment, and a consistent record of successful enforcement, the mark satisfies the criteria under Sections 11(6) and 11(7) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and may be declared a well-known trademark within the meaning of Section 2(1)(zg) of the Act. Accordingly, the Court declared “CALPOL” to be a well-known trademark for medicinal and pharmaceutical products under Section 2(1)(zg) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Jyoti Singh noted that the plaintiff had placed material showing continuous, uninterrupted and extensive use of the CALPOL mark since 1991 in relation to tablets, syrups and oral drops containing paracetamol and related ingredients, supported by invoices and documentary evidence of use. The Bench also took note of the plaintiff’s evidence that CALPOL products had been continuously and extensively marketed through advertisements, promotional campaigns, print and online coverage, and that search engine results generated numerous hits only for the plaintiff’s mark.
The Delhi High Court has held that where, in a trade mark infringement action, the plaintiff establishes registration, goodwill, and deceptive similarity between the rival marks on the basis of undisputed documentary evidence, and the served defendants neither appear nor file their written statements within the prescribed period, the Court may grant summary judgment under Order XIII-A CPC if the defendants have no real prospect of successfully defending the suit.
The Court further held that marks obtained by minor alterations to a registered trade mark, such as omission or substitution of letters, may still be deceptively similar if they retain structural, visual, and phonetic similarity so as to cause likelihood of confusion or association among consumers; and even initial interest confusion is sufficient to attract infringement under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Tejas Karia observed that defendant nos. 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 had failed to enter appearance or raise any defence despite due service of summons, and their right to file written statements had already been closed. In these circumstances, and in light of the documentary material placed on record, the Single Judge held that no useful purpose would be served by sending the matter to trial, particularly when no defence had been raised and the defendants did not appear to have any real prospect of successfully defending the suit.
In an interim application in a suit filed before the Delhi High Court under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (CPC), seeking interim injunction against the defendants to restrain the copyright infringement of Trimurti Films Private Ltd (Trimurti Films) by incorporating the sound recording ‘Tirchi Topiwale’ from the film ‘Tridev’ both in its original form and as a remixed version in the film ‘Dhurandhar: The Revenge’, a Single Judge Bench of Justice Tushar Rao Gedela, did not accede to the plaintiff’s prayers, but directed defendant 3 to deposit Rs. 50 Lakhs to balance equity.
The Court found it intriguing how the promoter of Trimurti Films sought to explain away the non-disclosure of material facts in the plaint. The Court perused his affidavit and observed that he had stated facts which did not appear to be in line with either the plant, the application seeking interim relief, or the rejoinder. It was said that the affidavit did not instil confidence in the contents of the plaint, and even though it may not mean that Trimurti Films did not have a case on merits. However, for considering an application seeking interim relief under discretionary jurisdiction, the same gathered great significance.
The Court perused the agreement in a holistic and harmonious manner and opined that granting all rights and title in the musical, literary and dramatic works in the “said work” i.e., which included the cinematograph film, but excluded the cinematograph film by itself by incorporation in the definition of record contained in the agreement. The Court found this to be the sole reason why defendant 3 had not exploited the copyright in the film ‘Tridev’ by itself. It was found that defendant 3 was at liberty to produce/reproduce remixed versions of the songs in ‘Tridev’. The Court found this to be the only reason why Trimurti Films did not initiate any legal action regarding the use and exploitation of certain songs in the films ‘Azhar’ and ‘KGF: Chapter 1’.